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The White House听just warned听that there is a 鈥渄istinct possibility鈥� that Russia will invade Ukraine in a 鈥渧ery swift time frame.鈥� More than听100,000 Russian troops听are now massed near Ukraine on three sides.

But what does the Russian public think about armed intervention in Ukraine? This question is important. Even though Russia is an autocracy, its听leaders听pay听attention听to public sentiment. Our new polling data suggests that invading Ukraine could be a difficult sell within Russia.

Support for armed intervention has fallen by nearly half since 2016. And that drop has occurred among supporters of Putin鈥檚 United Russia Party, Communists and the nationalist LDPR party alike. Among those most nostalgic for the Soviet Union, for whom restoration of the Soviet sphere of influence could be expected to resonate most, fewer than 10 percent want to see Russian troops fight in Ukraine.

If Putin does invade Ukraine, he will have to convince the Russian people that it was the right move or risk harm to his听popularity, which remains lower than during most of his time in office. It takes effort, even with a formidable state media apparatus, to effectively shift public opinion 鈥� which suggests that the Kremlin would be making a wager about how far, how fast and among which groups it can succeed. The uncertainty entails risk.

This is especially true given that Russia鈥檚 government-controlled media have emphasized that Moscow has听no plans to听invade. The information barrage against Ukraine and the West that accompanied Russia鈥檚 2014 annexation of Crimea so far听has not arrived. To change tack now would require a heavy propaganda lift.

Of course, public opposition has not always constrained Putin鈥檚 actions. Russians were not eager for war in Ukraine before the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and polls before Russia鈥檚 intervention in Syria showed opposition. Yet听public opinion changed quickly听as events on the ground unfolded 鈥� and this could, in principle, happen again. Once Ukrainian President听Viktor Yanukovych听fled the country in 2014 amid the Euromaidan protests,听Russian state media听kicked into gear. Public opinion toward Ukraine听deteriorated听very rapidly.

The Kremlin might be wagering that it can persuade Russians to align with whatever decision Putin ultimately makes about Ukraine. In recent years, Putin has tightened听control听over Russian media and sidelined critical journalists and听independent outlets. Meanwhile, Russians (like other publics) are less focused on foreign policy than domestic policy. Even as the conflict along Ukraine鈥檚 border escalated in late 2021, fewer than 5 percent of Russians nationwide ranked any foreign policy issue 鈥� including Russia鈥檚 position in the world, relations with the West or the situation in Ukraine 鈥� among the top three issues facing Russia.

Still, there is reason to think securing public support for a wider conflict in Ukraine will not be as easy as it was to secure public approval for the annexation of Crimea.听Surveys听well before Russia took over Crimea showed that most Russians thought Crimea was actually听Russian territory听鈥� but that鈥檚 not how Russians see the rest of Ukraine. People have consistently听opposed听annexing Ukraine鈥檚 Donbas region, for example. And听polls听over the past decade show that Russians do not in fact want to annex Ukraine to re-create the Soviet Union.

If Vladimir Putin鈥檚 rule increasingly relies on a picture of the West as an听enemy, remarkably few Russians want Russia to treat the West as such. Only about 6 percent nationwide said Russia should approach the West as an enemy. In August and December, even as the current crisis was unfolding, Russians were more likely to prefer treating the West as an ally (44-46 percent) or even friend (13-15 percent), and much less likely to favor treating it as a rival (27-31 percent).

This has听long听been the pattern under Putin, and our polls indicate no ratcheting up of hostility toward the West either during the September听parliamentary election听or as Russia mobilized more troops to Ukraine鈥檚 border between August and December.

Russians also do not see Putin as favoring a hostile stance toward the West. In December, a majority said Putin thinks Russia should treat the West as an ally (39 percent) or friend (11 percent). This has been the听case听in all prior Russian Election Studies surveys dating back to 2003, when the question was first asked.

The surveys also suggest that while Russians do not want to annex Ukraine or to treat the West as an enemy, they do think it is important to resist NATO. At home, Putin has been emphasizing that听NATO is to blame听for the ratcheting up of tensions, and the public appears to share this view. Three in 4 Russians we surveyed think NATO will try to weaken their country if Putin does not stand up to it. Consistently over many years, surveys show that Russians see NATO as a threat听even听as they want good relations with the West.

While Russians oppose a broader conflict in Ukraine and would rather not approach the West as an antagonist, standing up to NATO is a popular theme. It鈥檚 likely that a strategy of hard-nosed and prolonged听negotiations听would be more popular with Putin鈥檚 domestic audience than armed intervention. But time may be running out.

This article first appeared in the on 11^th February 2022.

Links

• Original article in the
• UCL Department of Political Science
• UCL Faculty of Social & Historical Sciences

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