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As Russia鈥檚 war in Ukraine continues, China鈥檚 role has been thrown into sharp relief. Prior to the war, some听commentators 听suggested that China would openly side with Russia or seek to act as a mediator 鈥� so far Beijing appears to have resisted doing either.

As Qin Gang, China鈥檚 ambassador to the US, wrote recently in the听Washington Post, Beijing has nothing to gain from this war, arguing 鈥渨ielding the baton of sanctions at Chinese companies while seeking China鈥檚 support and cooperation simply won鈥檛 work鈥�. Ambassador Qin also stressed that Beijing had no prior knowledge of the conflict, rejected any attempts to profit from the crisis and called on all sides to join peace negotiations.

Since Russia began the war in Ukraine, China has declared a de facto policy of neutrality. So far, Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, has been at pains to point out 鈥淐hina is not a party to the crisis, nor does it want sanctions听to affect China鈥�. The decision to stay neutral reflects Beijing鈥檚 precarious position in the conflict. China had previously sought greater alignment with the Putin regime, based on shared antipathy to US and western power, including via a听joint statement听struck earlier this year, which confirmed a partnership with 鈥渘o limits鈥� and 鈥渘o forbidden areas of cooperation鈥�.

Since the Ukraine invasion, Beijing has not explicitly condoned nor condemned Russia鈥檚 actions in Ukraine and has hesitated to refer to the crisis as a war. Crucially, it also chose to abstain from both a United Nations Security Council听resolution vote to end the Ukraine crisis and a听UN General Assembly听vote condemning Moscow鈥檚 actions. It has, however, recently described its relationship with Russia as 鈥渋ron-clad鈥�.

There have been fears that China could use the cover of this crisis to press its territorial claims on听Taiwan. But the pervasive international condemnation of the Ukraine invasion, and the mounting list of tactical failures of the Russian military, makes the chances of action by Beijing against Taiwan less likely.

However, China has also been very careful not to make enemies in Europe. Ukraine and much of the former Soviet Union are key components in China鈥檚 ongoing听Belt-and-Road听initiatives to build a massive international infrastructure of trade routes. In his Washington Post article, ambassador Qin explicitly talks about China鈥檚 history of trade with Ukraine, as well as with Russia. These moves all clearly signal that China is trying to steer a complex course between Russia and the west.

Beijing is, of course, also mindful of the reputational damage that siding with Moscow would have. While many of the Chinese brands have not pulled out of Russia, unlike their western counterparts, the withdrawal of Chinese-owned听听was a sign that Beijing was also keeping an eye on its international reputation.

Western sanctions and rouble volatility mean Chinese firms are not keen to jump into the Russian market to replace departing western companies. This is especially since any foreign assistance to Russia would be swiftly noticed by the international community. But the Chinese leadership has also听been critical听of US threats to retaliate should Beijing be seen as assisting Russia in evading international sanctions.

Rather than trying to get Beijing to act as a mediator in the conflict, western powers seem most concerned about China offering an economic or military lifeline to听Russia. This would undermine the myriad sanctions and punitive measures that the west has put in place against听the Putin regime, effectively unplugging Russia from the global economy.

There have been worrying reports, since denied by听both governments, that Chinese-Russian logistical and military cooperation was听under discussion. This concern was the subject of talks between US and Chinese officials in Rome on March 14. President Xi is not in the best position to face international ire over Russia given China鈥檚 slowing economy and ongoing internal battles over rising cases of听COVID. There鈥檚 also a Chinese Communist Party Congress later this year when Xi is expected to be granted a third term in office, but will face questions about the country鈥檚 economic reforms and post-pandemic recovery.

While China鈥檚 economy is听far more robust听than Russia鈥檚, the Xi government is still not able to risk the same global ostracism as Moscow. China鈥檚 ambitious economic expansion plans are based on a globalised economy. It is in Chinese interests now to protect that economy from a volatile period exacerbated by the pandemic, supply chain questions and a conflict which is already rattling numerous markets around the world.

This article first appeared in on 18^th March 2022.

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• Original article in
• UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies
• UCL Social and Historical Sciences

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• St. Basil's听Cathedral and Kremlin. Moscow. Russia.听